Stochastic stability in assignment problems

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2016
Volume: 62
Issue: C
Pages: 62-74

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a dynamic model of assignment problems, it is shown that small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or payoff under uniform errors, nor for agents with multiple optimal partners under payoff-dependent errors. There can be selection of payoff for agents with a unique optimal partner under payoff-dependent errors. However, when every agent has a unique optimal partner, almost-no-selection is obtained.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:62-74
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25