Laws of scarcity for a finite game - exact bounds on estimations

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2005
Volume: 26
Issue: 2
Pages: 383-396

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of games and exact bounds on the maximum possible deviation of approximate core payoff vectors from satisfying a law of scarcity are stated in terms of the parameters describing the games. We note that the parameters can, in principle, be estimated. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:383-396
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25