Institution: University of Glasgow
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 4.02 | 2.01 | 0.00 | 10.05 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2005 | Laws of scarcity for a finite game - exact bounds on estimations | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2003 | Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2002 | Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2001 | Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |