Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 108
Issue: 3
Pages: 283-285

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The first full characterization of social choice correspondences that are implementable in Nash equilibrium, given in Moore and Repullo (1990), together with the working principle behind an algorithm to check this condition, given in Sjöström (1991), can be used to give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for implementation that is a generalization of monotonicity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:283-285
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25