Institution: Turun Yliopisto
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.67 | 2.51 | 0.00 | 3.85 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 1.34 | 5.53 | 0.00 | 8.21 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 3.35 | 5.53 | 0.00 | 13.24 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Two-player rationalizable implementation | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2025 | The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view | Economic Theory | B | 3 |
| 2024 | Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2023 | Behavioral strong implementation | Economic Theory | B | 4 |
| 2021 | Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2020 | Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2020 | Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2018 | Procedurally fair implementation under complete information | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 1 |
| 2013 | A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2010 | Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations | Economics Letters | C | 1 |