Institution: Johns Hopkins University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 47% |
| All Time | 2.69 | 5.05 | 5.05 | 1.01 | 13.79 | 91% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 4 |
| 2017 | Dynamic Agenda Setting | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2015 | Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2015 | Career Concerns and Excessive Risk Taking | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy | B | 1 |
| 2014 | Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2014 | Effective Persuasion | International Economic Review | B | 2 |
| 2012 | Value of public information in sender–receiver games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2011 | Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |