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Olivier Compte

Institution: Paris School of Economics

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/compte

First Publication: 1998

Most Recent: 2010

RePEc ID: pco375 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
All Time 16.15 10.09 3.36 0.00 29.60 96%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 11
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 12.45

Publications (11)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2010 Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective Journal of Political Economy S 2
2009 Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2008 Gathering information before signing a contract: A screening perspective International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2007 On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design American Economic Review S 2
2004 Confidence-Enhanced Performance American Economic Review S 2
2004 Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games Review of Economic Studies S 2
2003 Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2002 On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2002 On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2002 Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion European Economic Review B 3
1998 Bargaining while searching for outside options: A potential role for unions European Economic Review B 3