Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2010
Volume: 118
Issue: 2
Pages: 189-221

Authors (2)

Olivier Compte (not in RePEc) Philippe Jehiel (Paris School of Economics)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study collective search processes in which members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance decision is made according to majority rule. We study which members have more impact on the decision, as well as the degree of randomness of the decision. When proposals vary along a single dimension, the acceptance set is small, and at most two members determine the outcome whatever the majority rule. When proposals vary along many dimensions, the acceptance set is large except under unanimity and all members affect the distribution of decisions. Various implications are drawn. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:118:y:2010:i:2:p:189-221
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25