Loading...

← Back to Leaderboard

John Duggan

Institution: University of Rochester

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.rochester.edu/college/PSC/duggan/

First Publication: 1996

Most Recent: 2009

RePEc ID: pdu172 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
All Time 4.04 20.18 10.76 6.05 41.04 97%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 25
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 33.99

Publications (25)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2009 Private polling in elections and voter welfare Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2009 Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2009 Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections Journal of Public Economic Theory C 2
2007 Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2007 Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2007 A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets Social Choice and Welfare C 1
2006 Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2006 A note on uniqueness of electoral equilibrium when the median voter is unobserved Economics Letters C 1
2006 A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games Social Choice and Welfare C 2
2006 Endogenous Voting Agendas Social Choice and Welfare C 1
2005 Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2003 Nash implementation with a private good Economic Theory B 1
2003 Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2002 Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections, Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2002 Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution American Economic Review S 2
2001 A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2001 Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments Social Choice and Welfare C 2
2000 Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized Social Choice and Welfare C 2
1999 An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations, Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1999 A General Extension Theorem for Binary Relations Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1997 Hansson's theorem for generalized social welfare functions: an extension Social Choice and Welfare C 1
1996 A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem (*) Economic Theory B 1
1996 Arrow's Theorem in Public Good Environments with Convex Technologies Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1996 Dutta's Minimal Covering Set and Shapley's Saddles Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1996 A Geometric Proof of Gibbard's Random Dictatorship Theorem. Economic Theory B 1