Institution: Rice University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://he6.web.rice.edu/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 1.51 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 4.02 |
| All Time | 1.68 | 7.54 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 23.46 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 4 |
| 2017 | Dynamic Agenda Setting | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2017 | Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2014 | Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2013 | Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2010 | Information-based trade | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2010 | Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals | Review of Economic Studies | S | 2 |
| 2004 | Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2002 | Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design | European Economic Review | B | 3 |
| 2002 | Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2002 | Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |