|
2021
|
Forecast Hedging and Calibration
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Posterior probabilities: Dominance and optimism
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
The query complexity of correlated equilibria
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2017
|
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Commentary: Nash equilibrium and dynamics
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2011
|
Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
1
|
|
2010
|
How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2009
|
An Operational Measure of Riskiness
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2009
|
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2008
|
Michael's questions
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2006
|
Robert Aumann's Game and Economic Theory
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
2006
|
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2003
|
Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2003
|
Regret-based continuous-time dynamics
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2002
|
Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2001
|
A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1999
|
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
1997
|
The Absent-Minded Driver
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
1997
|
The Forgetful Passenger
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
1996
|
Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1996
|
"Knowing Whether," "Knowing That," and The Cardinality of State Spaces
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1988
|
Values of non-atomic vector measure games : Are they linear combinations of the measures?
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
1982
|
The number of commodities required to represent a market game
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1982
|
Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1977
|
Asymptotic value of games with a continuum of players
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1977
|
Values of non-differentiable markets with a continuum of traders
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1974
|
Formation of cartels in large markets
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1974
|
On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
3
|
|
1974
|
Equally distributed correspondences
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
2
|