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Frank Heinemann

Global rank #35716 59%

Institution: Technische Universität Berlin, Fakultät für Wirtschaft und Management

Primary Field: General (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.tu.berlin/macroeconomics/team/prof-dr-frank-heinemann

First Publication: Unknown

Most Recent: Unknown

RePEc ID: phe217 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 1.41 3.02 0.00 5.83
Last 10 Years 0.00 2.08 3.02 0.00 7.17
All Time 2.68 4.76 5.36 0.00 26.61

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 14
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 0.00

Publications (14)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 An experimental test of the global-game selection in coordination games with asymmetric players Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2023 Measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes Experimental Economics A 5
2022 Monetary policy obeying the Taylor principle turns prices into strategic substitutes Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2021 Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment: Experimental evidence Journal of Monetary Economics A 2
2019 The power of sunspots: An experimental analysis Journal of Monetary Economics A 3
2014 Guarantees, transparency and the interdependency between sovereign and bank default risk Journal of Banking & Finance B 3
2014 Measuring agents’ reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities Experimental Economics A 2
2013 Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2013 Crossing network versus dealer market: Unique equilibrium in the allocation of order flow European Economic Review B 3
2009 Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information* Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
2009 Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games Review of Economic Studies S 3
2002 Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency Journal of International Economics A 2
2002 Exchange-rate Attack as a Coordination Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 1
2000 Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment American Economic Review S 1