Institution: Osaka University
Primary Field: General (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/view/ishiguro/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 2.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8.04 |
| All Time | 5.03 | 4.02 | 5.03 | 0.00 | 34.18 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Relationships and Growth: On the Dynamic Interplay between Relational Contracts and Competitive Markets in Economic Development | Review of Economic Studies | S | 1 |
| 2010 | Holdup, search, and inefficiency | Economic Theory | B | 1 |
| 2010 | Contracts, search, and organizational diversity | European Economic Review | B | 1 |
| 2004 | Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2004 | Collusion and discrimination in organizations | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2003 | Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase Theorem revisited | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2002 | Optimal Incentives for Teams: Comment | American Economic Review | S | 1 |
| 2002 | Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2001 | Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents | Review of Economic Studies | S | 2 |