Institution: Korea University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 4.04 | 2.02 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 6.73 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2004 | Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1996 | Employee Buyout in a Bargaining Game with Asymmetric Information. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |