Institution: HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 47% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.02 | 4.04 | 1.01 | 7.06 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2014 | Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2013 | Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2012 | A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |