Roger B. Myerson

Global rank #236 99%

Institution: University of Chicago

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/

First Publication: 1978

Most Recent: 2020

RePEc ID: pmy13 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period	S (4x)	A (2x)	B (1x)	Total
Last 5 Years	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Last 10 Years	3.02	0.00	0.00	12.07
All Time	13.74	11.06	29.83	107.92

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 34

Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 56.88

Publications (34)

Year	Article	Journal	Tier	Authors
2020	Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions	Econometrica	S	2
2017	Political Economics in the Journal of Political Economy: Six Landmark Papers	Journal of Political Economy	S	1
2015	Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy	Econometrica	S	1
2015	Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria	Econometrica	S	2
2014	Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents	Journal of Economic Theory	A	1
2014	Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan	World Development	B	1
2012	Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections	Economic Theory	B	2
2012	A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles	Journal of Political Economy	S	1
2008	Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory	American Economic Review	S	1
2007	Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights	Review of Economic Dynamics	B	2
2007	Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication	Games and Economic Behavior	B	2
2007	Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information	Journal of Economic Theory	A	1
2006	Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption	Scandanavian Journal of Economics	B	1
2006	Population uncertainty in contests	Economic Theory	B	2
2005	Economic Effects of Constitutions	Economica	C	1
2002	Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games	Journal of Economic Theory	A	1
2001	Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
2000	Large Poisson Games	Journal of Economic Theory	A	1
1999	Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures	American Economic Review	S	2
1999	Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems	European Economic Review	B	1
1999	Informational origins of political bias towards critical groups of voters	European Economic Review	B	1
1998	Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
1997	Dual Reduction and Elementary Games	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
1996	John Nash's Contribution to Economics	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
1995	Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
1993	Game-Theoretic Models of Politics	Games and Economic Behavior	B	2
1993	Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
1991	Viscous population equilibria	Games and Economic Behavior	B	3
1989	Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans	Journal of Economic Theory	A	1
1986	An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria	Review of Economic Studies	S	3
1983	A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	1
1983	Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading	Journal of Economic Theory	A	2
1982	Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems	Journal of Mathematical Economics	B	1
1978	Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion.	American Economic Review	S	1