Institution: University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 22% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 4.04 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 5.72 | 75% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 13.45 | 2.35 | 0.00 | 15.81 | 92% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication | Economic Theory | B | 3 |
| 2017 | Mechanism design with information acquisition | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2017 | Collusion and heterogeneity of firms | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2017 | Repeated games with general discounting | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2014 | Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2009 | Firm reputation and horizontal integration | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2009 | Folk theorem with communication | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2002 | Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2002 | The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |