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Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Global rank #860 99%

Institution: Princeton University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.princeton.edu/~pesendor/

First Publication: 1995

Most Recent: 2015

RePEc ID: ppe7 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All Time 12.74 7.04 2.01 0.00 67.03

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 22
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 21.88

Publications (22)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2015 Hurwicz expected utility and subjective sources Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2014 Random Choice as Behavioral Optimization Econometrica S 3
2014 Expected Uncertain Utility Theory Econometrica S 2
2012 The War of Information Review of Economic Studies S 2
2010 Strategic Redistricting American Economic Review S 2
2009 Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2009 A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2007 The evolution of cooperation through imitation Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2007 Welfare without Happiness American Economic Review S 2
2007 Harmful Addiction Review of Economic Studies S 2
2005 Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2005 The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes Review of Economic Studies S 2
2004 Self Control, Revealed Preferences and Consumption Choice Review of Economic Dynamics B 2
2003 Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice Review of Economic Studies S 2
2001 Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2000 Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions American Economic Review S 2
1998 When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1996 Reputation in Dynamic Games Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1996 The Swing Voter's Curse. American Economic Review S 2
1995 When Are Agents Negligible? American Economic Review S 2
1995 Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles. American Economic Review S 1
1995 Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model Journal of Economic Theory A 1