Institution: Université Catholique de Louvain
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/~ramaekers
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 1.68 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 2.68 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 4 |
| 2017 | Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2010 | Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |