Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization

A-Tier

Journal: Journal of Economic Theory

Year: 2019

Volume: 180

Issue: C

Pages: 229-243

Authors (4)

Mukherjee, Saptarshi (not in RePEc) Muto, Nozomu (not in RePEc) Ramaekers, Eve (Université Catholique de Louva...) Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We show that the Pareto correspondence can be implemented in weakly undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. This resolves a question raised in Börgers (1991). The result is also extended to show that all social choice correspondences satisfying tops-inclusivity and a requirement called the seconds-property can be implemented.

Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization

Authors (4)

Abstract

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