Institution: Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 2.86 | 0.00 | 4.88 | 71% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 3.36 | 6.22 | 0.00 | 9.59 | 88% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2019 | How many markets for wholesale electricity when supply ispartially flexible? | Energy Economics | A | 2 |
| 2018 | Zero-sum revision games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 4 |
| 2017 | Optimal dynamic information provision | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2016 | Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2014 | Secure message transmission on directed networks | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Dynamic sender–receiver games | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2005 | A folk theorem for minority games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2004 | Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2004 | Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |