Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2004
Volume: 49
Issue: 2
Pages: 313-344

Authors (2)

Renault, Jerome (Toulouse School of Economics (...) Tomala, Tristan (HEC Paris (École des Hautes Ét...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:2:p:313-344
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29