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Dmitry Ryvkin

Global rank #2360 97%

Institution: RMIT University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://sites.google.com/view/dryvkin

First Publication: 2007

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pry16 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.67 3.02 0.00 4.36
Last 10 Years 0.00 3.69 8.78 0.00 17.24
All Time 0.00 4.69 20.58 0.00 31.05

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 29
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 27.57

Publications (29)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Do competitive bonuses ruin cooperation in heterogeneous teams? Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 4
2023 Defaults and cognitive effort Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 4
2022 The effect of options to reward and punish on behavior in bargaining Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2022 The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2021 Indefinitely repeated contests: An experimental study Experimental Economics A 3
2020 Corrupt police Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2020 How noise affects effort in tournaments Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2020 Tournament rewards and heavy tails Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2020 Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2019 Contests between groups of unknown size Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2019 IS MORE COMPETITION ALWAYS BETTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF EXTORTIONARY CORRUPTION Economic Inquiry C 2
2018 Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2017 THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN TOURNAMENTS OF HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS Economic Inquiry C 4
2017 Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2017 Piece-rates and tournaments: Implications for learning in a cognitively challenging task Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 5
2017 Biased contests for symmetric players Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2017 I paid a bribe: An experiment on information sharing and extortionary corruption European Economic Review B 3
2017 An experimental study of democracy breakdown, income and inequality Experimental Economics A 2
2016 PRIMING THE CHARITABLE PUMP: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF TWO-STAGE RAFFLES Economic Inquiry C 3
2015 Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives Games and Economic Behavior B 5
2015 Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2015 An experimental study of sorting in group contests Labour Economics B 3
2014 An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information Experimental Economics A 2
2013 Heterogeneity of Players and Aggregate Effort in Contests Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
2012 How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2011 Fatigue in Dynamic Tournaments Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
2011 The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2010 Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making Public Choice B 2
2007 Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players Public Choice B 1