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Dov Samet

Global rank #645 99%

Institution: Tel Aviv University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.tau.ac.il/~samet

First Publication: 1987

Most Recent: 2022

RePEc ID: psa836 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 3.02 0.00 3.02
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 5.03 0.00 5.03
All Time 0.67 8.38 31.91 0.00 51.34

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 35
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 41.13

Publications (35)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2022 The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2022 Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2020 Dominance rationality: A unified approach Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2018 Coalition preferences with individual prospects Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2015 Agreeing to agree and Dutch books Games and Economic Behavior B 5
2014 Conditional belief types Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2014 Belief consistency and trade consistency Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2014 Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2013 Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2012 How common are common priors? Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2011 Generalized Raiffa solutions Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2010 A commitment folk theorem Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2010 Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2005 Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2005 A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2005 Counterfactuals in wonderland Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2004 Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes Journal of Political Economy S 3
2004 An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2004 Bargaining with an agenda Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2003 Between liberalism and democracy Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2000 Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quantities Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1999 Coherent beliefs are not always types Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
1998 Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily High Rank Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1998 Iterated Expectations and Common Priors Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1998 Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1998 Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1997 Belief Affirming in Learning Processes, Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1996 "Knowing Whether," "Knowing That," and The Cardinality of State Spaces Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1996 Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1995 Stochastic Common Learning Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1990 Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1989 Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1989 Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1987 Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders Public Choice B 2
1987 Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock Public Choice B 2