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Marius Schwartz

Global rank #1288 98%

Institution: Georgetown University

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1983

Most Recent: 2023

RePEc ID: psc463 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.67 1.01 0.00 2.85
Last 10 Years 0.00 1.68 2.01 0.00 6.37
All Time 7.04 7.71 6.70 0.00 54.13

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 25
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 29.28

Publications (25)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2023 Product innovation with vertical differentiation: Is a monopolist's incentive weaker? International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2021 Competitive differential pricing RAND Journal of Economics A 3
2021 Vertical mergers with input substitution: Double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare Economics Letters C 2
2020 Platform Competition With Cash‐Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2017 Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2016 Churn Versus Diversion in Antitrust: An Illustrative Model Economica C 2
2015 Differential pricing when costs differ: a welfare analysis RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2013 Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2012 Economics at the FCC, 2011–2012: Spectrum Incentive Auctions, Universal Service and Intercarrier Compensation Reform, and Mergers Review of Industrial Organization B 3
2006 COMPATIBILITY INCENTIVES OF A LARGE NETWORK FACING MULTIPLE RIVALS* Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2004 Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Reply American Economic Review S 2
2001 International Telecom Settlements: Gaming Incentives, Carrier Alliances and Pareto‐Superior Reform Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2001 repec:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:335-77 Journal of Industrial Economics A 1
2000 Discussant Comments on Papers by Andrew Joskow, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Janusz Ordover and Margaret Guerin-Calvert Review of Industrial Organization B 1
1995 Equity as a call option on assets: Some tests for failed banks Economics Letters C 3
1995 The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium Economics Letters C 2
1994 Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination Journal of International Economics A 2
1994 Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity. American Economic Review S 2
1990 Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result. American Economic Review S 1
1989 Investments in Oligopoly: Welfare Effects and Tests for Predation. Oxford Economic Papers C 1
1988 Entry-deterrence externalities and relative firm size International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
1987 The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment. American Economic Review S 1
1986 The Nature and Scope of Contestability Theory. Oxford Economic Papers C 1
1986 Divisionalization and Entry Deterrence Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
1983 Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Comment. American Economic Review S 2