Pierpaolo Battigalli

Institution: Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://faculty.unibocconi.eu/pierpaolobattigalli/

First Publication: 1996

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pba80 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period	S (4x)	A (2x)	B (1x)	C (½x)	Total	Percentile
Last 5 Years	0.00	5.38	2.69	0.34	8.41	93%
Last 10 Years	2.02	6.39	8.58	0.59	17.58	96%
All Time	12.11	24.56	14.30	0.59	51.55	98%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 33

Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 30.80

Publications (33)

Year	Article	Journal	Tier	Authors
2025	Guilt aversion and inequality in dictator games	Economics Letters	C	3
2025	Sophisticated reasoning, learning, and equilibrium in repeated games with imperfect feedback	Economic Theory	B	2
2024	Information flows and memory in games	Games and Economic Behavior	B	2
2024	The epistemic spirit of divinity	Journal of Economic Theory	A	2
2023	Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games	Games and Economic Behavior	B	3
2023	Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games	Journal of Economic Theory	A	3
2021	Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games	Journal of Economic Theory	A	2
2020	Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment	Games and Economic Behavior	B	3
2020	Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games	Games and Economic Behavior	B	3
2020	Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures	Games and Economic Behavior	B	3
2019	Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	4
2019	Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games	Games and Economic Behavior	B	4
2019	Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games	Games and Economic Behavior	B	3
2019	Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	3
2019	Learning and self-confirming long-run biases	Journal of Economic Theory	A	4
2019	Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies	Economic Theory	B	2
2017	Mixed extensions of decision problems under uncertainty	Economic Theory	B	4
2016	Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium	Journal of Mathematical Economics	C	4
2016	A Note on Comparative Ambiguity Aversion and Justifiability	Econometrica	S	4
2015	Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty	American Economic Review	S	4
2013	Deception: The role of guilt	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	3
2009	Dynamic psychological games	Journal of Economic Theory	A	2
2008	Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship	RAND Journal of Economics	A	2
2007	Guilt in Games	American Economic Review	S	2
2003	Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions	Games and Economic Behavior	B	2
2002	Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts	American Economic Review	S	2
2002	Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning	Journal of Economic Theory	A	2
1999	Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games	Journal of Economic Theory	A	2
1997	Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
1997	On Rationalizability in Extensive Games	Journal of Economic Theory	A	1
1996	Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
1996	Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria	Journal of Economic Theory	A	1
1996	A Note on Stochastic Independence without Savage-Null Events	Journal of Economic Theory	A	2