Institution: National Taiwan University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.35 | 0.00 | 1.35 | 35% |
| All Time | 2.69 | 0.00 | 4.20 | 0.34 | 7.23 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2018 | A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2015 | An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2015 | Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty | Economics Letters | C | 3 |
| 2014 | Confucianism and preferences: Evidence from lab experiments in Taiwan and China | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2011 | Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 4 |
| 2010 | Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2006 | Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |