Loading...

← Back to Leaderboard

Alexander Wolitzky

Institution: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/wolitzky

First Publication: 2009

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pwo172 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 32.29 4.04 0.00 0.00 36.33 99%
Last 10 Years 55.16 8.07 0.00 0.00 63.24 99%
All Time 67.27 10.09 6.05 0.00 83.42 99%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 23
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 27.92

Publications (23)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport Journal of Political Economy S 3
2025 Marginal Reputation Econometrica S 2
2024 Mediated Collusion Journal of Political Economy S 3
2024 Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes American Economic Review: Insights A 2
2023 Unobserved-Offers Bargaining American Economic Review S 1
2023 Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games Econometrica S 2
2021 A Theory of Equality Before the Law Economic Journal A 2
2021 Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners’ Past Play Review of Economic Studies S 3
2021 A General, Practicable Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Review of Economic Studies S 2
2021 Communication and Community Enforcement Journal of Political Economy S 2
2020 Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement versus Specialized Enforcement Journal of the European Economic Association A 2
2020 A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information American Economic Review S 2
2020 The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching Econometrica S 3
2018 Learning from Others' Outcomes American Economic Review S 1
2018 Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2018 Maintaining Privacy in Cartels Journal of Political Economy S 2
2016 Capital Taxation under Political Constraints American Economic Review S 2
2014 Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model American Economic Review S 2
2013 Endogenous institutions and political extremism Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2013 Cooperation with Network Monitoring Review of Economic Studies S 1
2012 A search cost model of obfuscation RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2011 Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2009 Fully sincere voting Games and Economic Behavior B 1