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Arunava Sen

Global rank #2746 96%

Institution: Indian Statistical Institute

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.isid.ac.in/~asen/

First Publication: 1990

Most Recent: 2020

RePEc ID: pse157 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 1.17 1.17 0.00 3.52
All Time 1.01 8.28 8.21 0.00 30.30

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 25
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 20.60

Publications (25)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2020 Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms Journal of Mathematical Economics B 4
2019 Matching with partners and projects Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2019 Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization Journal of Economic Theory A 4
2018 Conditional expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2015 On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good Journal of Economic Theory A 5
2014 Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains Journal of Mathematical Economics B 4
2014 Random dictatorship domains Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2013 On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2012 The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2012 Nash implementation with partially honest individuals Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2012 Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2012 An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: The two alternative case Economics Letters C 2
2011 Tops-only domains Economic Theory B 2
2005 Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394] Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2003 Dictatorial domains Economic Theory B 3
2002 Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2001 Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2001 Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Economics Letters C 1
1998 Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1996 Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1994 Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen Games and Economic Behavior B 4
1994 Bayesian Implementation: The Necessity of Infinite Mechanisms Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1991 Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
1991 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation Review of Economic Studies S 2
1990 Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition Journal of Economic Theory A 2