An “Opposing Responses” Test of Classic versus Market-Based Promotion Tournaments

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2016
Volume: 34
Issue: 3
Pages: 747 - 779

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We use a systems-based econometric method to show that classic and market-based tournament models are empirically distinguishable since the role of risk differs across these models. Implementing the method using a large, Finnish, worker-firm matched panel, we find support for classic tournaments given that promotions depend on relative performance, the firm’s wage structure is convex, promotion probabilities are decreasing in the number of competitors, performance is increasing in the wage spread, and workers and firms adjust their choice variables in opposite directions when the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance changes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/684911
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25