Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2020
Volume: 124
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to act less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation -rather than its benefits- are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:124:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120300441
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25