Institution: New Economic School (NES)
Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/view/drugov/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 2.02 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 78% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 6.05 | 4.04 | 0.00 | 10.09 | 88% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 15.47 | 5.05 | 0.00 | 20.52 | 94% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Score Disclosure | Economic Journal | A | 2 |
| 2021 | Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy | B | 1 |
| 2020 | How noise affects effort in tournaments | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2020 | Tournament rewards and heavy tails | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2019 | Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy | B | 2 |
| 2017 | Biased contests for symmetric players | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2014 | Financing Experimentation | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2014 | Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment | Experimental Economics | A | 3 |
| 2010 | Information and delay in an agency model | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 1 |
| 2010 | Competition in bureaucracy and corruption | Journal of Development Economics | A | 1 |