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Tore Ellingsen

Global rank #525 99%

Institution: Stockholm School of Economics

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/tellingsensse/

First Publication: 1991

Most Recent: 2020

RePEc ID: pel76 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 2.01 1.01 0.67 0.00 10.72
All Time 12.07 9.22 13.24 0.00 83.28

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 37
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 41.40

Publications (37)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2020 Rational Bubbles in UK Housing Markets: Comment on “No‐Bubble Condition: Model‐Free Tests in Housing Markets” Econometrica S 2
2018 Rational bubbles and public debt policy: A quantitative analysis Journal of Monetary Economics A 2
2018 How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2016 Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding Review of Economic Studies S 2
2014 Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2013 Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games Experimental Economics A 4
2013 Gender differences in social framing effects Economics Letters C 4
2012 Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs? Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2012 The private provision of excludable public goods: An inefficiency result Journal of Public Economics A 2
2011 What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts The Review of Financial Studies A 3
2011 Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games Economics Letters C 2
2011 Conspicuous generosity Journal of Public Economics A 2
2011 Conspicuous generosity Journal of Public Economics A 2
2011 Financial Contracting Under Imperfect Enforcement Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
2010 When Does Communication Improve Coordination? American Economic Review S 2
2010 Anchoring and cognitive ability Economics Letters C 4
2010 Testing guilt aversion Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2009 The aversion to lying Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 4
2009 Time is not money Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2008 Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory American Economic Review S 2
2008 Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining American Economic Review S 2
2007 Is generosity involuntary? Economics Letters C 3
2005 Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2004 In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit American Economic Review S 2
2004 Is There a Hold‐up Problem? Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
2003 repec:bla:econom:v:70:y:2003:i:278:p:233-250 Economica C 1
2002 Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2002 Monitoring and Pay Journal of Labor Economics A 2
2001 Monetary Policy and Market Interest Rates American Economic Review S 2
1998 Externalities vs internalities: a model of political integration Journal of Public Economics A 1
1997 Efficiency Wages and X‐Inefficiencies Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 1
1997 repec:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:4:p:581-96 Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 1
1997 Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
1997 The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior Quarterly Journal of Economics S 1
1996 Mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment Journal of International Economics A 2
1995 On flexibility in oligopoly Economics Letters C 1
1991 Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly. American Economic Review S 1