|
2025
|
Media Mergers in Nested Markets
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2021
|
From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model
|
Economic Journal
|
A
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2020
|
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
4
|
|
2020
|
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias
|
American Economic Review: Insights
|
A
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?”
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
3
|
|
2020
|
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2017
|
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
2017
|
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
2016
|
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2016
|
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2016
|
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements
|
Journal of the European Economic Association
|
A
|
2
|
|
2016
|
HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*
|
International Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Pessimistic information gathering
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2013
|
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2013
|
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and <fc>R</fc>&<fc>D</fc> Spending: Evidence From <fc>I</fc>taly
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2013
|
Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help!
|
Canadian Journal of Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America
|
World Bank Economic Review
|
B
|
4
|
|
2012
|
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2012
|
How much discretion for risk regulators?
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
3
|
|
2010
|
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2010
|
CONTRACTING FOR AN INNOVATION UNDER BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2010
|
The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2009
|
Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Selecting equilibria in common agency games
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2008
|
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2008
|
The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2007
|
The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2006
|
The benefits of extended liability
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2005
|
An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision
|
Journal of Economic Surveys
|
C
|
3
|
|
2005
|
The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2004
|
Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2004
|
The benefits of central bank's political independence
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2004
|
On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
2004
|
The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
2003
|
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
2001
|
On some agency costs of intermediated contracting
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2001
|
Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
1
|
|
2000
|
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth.
|
Journal of Economic Growth
|
A
|
2
|
|
1999
|
The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
1999
|
Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1999
|
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
1
|
|
1998
|
Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1998
|
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts Corrigendum
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1997
|
The Firm as a Multicontract Organization
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1997
|
Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers
|
Journal of International Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1996
|
The multiprincipal nature of government
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
1996
|
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|