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Sander Onderstal

Global rank #5219 94%

Institution: Universiteit van Amsterdam

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.uva.nl/en/profile/o/n/a.m.onderstal/a.m.onderstal.html

First Publication: 2005

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pon19 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.50 2.51 0.00 3.52
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.50 5.36 0.00 6.37
All Time 0.50 2.51 11.80 0.00 19.17

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 21
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 15.55

Publications (21)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Can Collaboration Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence From the Lab Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
2025 A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions Energy Economics A 4
2023 Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future Review of Industrial Organization B 3
2022 The Pricing Structure of Legal Services: Do Lawyers Offer What Clients Want? Review of Industrial Organization B 3
2021 Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 4
2020 Does relative grading help male students? Evidence from a field experiment in the classroom Economics of Education Review B 4
2020 Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions International Journal of Industrial Organization B 3
2019 Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2016 Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies European Economic Review B 3
2015 Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2014 Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions European Economic Review B 2
2014 Reprint of: Bidding to give in the field Journal of Public Economics A 3
2014 For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC Experimental Economics A 3
2013 Bidding to give in the field Journal of Public Economics A 3
2012 Self-selection and the power of incentive schemes: an experimental study Applied Economics C 3
2011 Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation International Journal of Industrial Organization B 3
2009 Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase Public Choice B 3
2009 The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions International Journal of Industrial Organization B 5
2009 Bidding for the unemployed: An application of mechanism design to welfare-to-work programs European Economic Review B 1
2007 Auctions with Financial Externalities Economic Theory B 2
2005 How (Not) to Raise Money Journal of Political Economy S 4