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Klaus M. Schmidt

Global rank #1268 98%

Institution: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.et.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/index.html

First Publication: 1993

Most Recent: 2017

RePEc ID: psc136 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 1.01 1.01 3.18 0.00 9.22
All Time 7.37 5.70 13.24 0.00 54.63

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 22
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 27.43

Publications (22)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2017 Delegating pricing power to customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 4
2017 You Owe Me American Economic Review S 2
2017 Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2017 Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 1
2017 Competition and incentives European Economic Review B 3
2015 Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation Review of Economic Studies S 2
2014 Complementary Patents and Market Structure Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
2012 Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs American Economic Review S 3
2010 On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2008 Two tales on resale International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2007 Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines American Economic Review S 2
2006 Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment American Economic Review S 3
2004 Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
2003 Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance Journal of Finance A 1
2000 Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices European Economic Review B 2
2000 The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation European Economic Review B 1
1999 A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
1997 Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition Review of Economic Studies S 1
1996 Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1996 Incomplete contracts and privatization European Economic Review B 1
1995 The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts Economics Letters C 2
1993 Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game Journal of Economic Theory A 1