|
2024
|
Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2024
|
On concave functions over lotteries
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
3
|
|
2022
|
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2022
|
A reputation for honesty
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2022
|
Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2022
|
Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
4
|
|
2021
|
Justified Communication Equilibrium
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2021
|
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2021
|
Working to learn
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners’ Past Play
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning
|
Econometrica
|
S
|
3
|
|
2020
|
Payoff information and learning in signaling games
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2018
|
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
|
Econometrica
|
S
|
2
|
|
2017
|
“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
4
|
|
2016
|
Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2015
|
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
2015
|
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility
|
Econometrica
|
S
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion
|
Econometrica
|
S
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2014
|
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2012
|
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
5
|
|
2012
|
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2012
|
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
3
|
|
2012
|
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2010
|
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Random matching in adaptive dynamics
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2009
|
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
2008
|
When is reputation bad?
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2008
|
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"
|
Review of Economic Dynamics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2007
|
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2007
|
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
|
Review of Economic Dynamics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Superstition and Rational Learning
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2006
|
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Imitation processes with small mutations
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2004
|
Word-of-mouth learning
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2004
|
Learning to play Bayesian games
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2003
|
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
2002
|
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2000
|
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2000
|
Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1999
|
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1999
|
Conditional Universal Consistency
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1999
|
An Easier Way to Calibrate
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1998
|
Learning in games
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1998
|
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1997
|
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Consistency and cautious fictitious play
|
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
|
B
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1995
|
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1994
|
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1993
|
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1993
|
Learning Mixed Equilibria
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1992
|
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1992
|
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1991
|
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1991
|
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1991
|
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1991
|
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1990
|
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1990
|
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1990
|
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1990
|
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1990
|
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
1989
|
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1988
|
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1988
|
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1987
|
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1987
|
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
3
|
|
1987
|
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1986
|
Limit games and limit equilibria
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1985
|
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1984
|
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1983
|
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
4
|
|
1983
|
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1983
|
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games,
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1983
|
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|