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2025
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Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms
|
Review of Economics and Statistics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2024
|
Race and the Mismeasure of School Quality
|
American Economic Review: Insights
|
A
|
4
|
|
2024
|
Credible School Value-Added with Undersubscribed School Lotteries
|
Review of Economics and Statistics
|
A
|
4
|
|
2024
|
Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2023
|
Choice and consequence: Assessing mismatch at Chicago exam schools
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2023
|
The Long-Term Effects of Universal Preschool in Boston
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
3
|
|
2022
|
Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design
|
Econometrica
|
S
|
4
|
|
2022
|
Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
4
|
|
2022
|
Reserve system design for allocation of scarce medical resources in a pandemic: some perspectives from the field
|
Oxford Review of Economic Policy
|
C
|
4
|
|
2021
|
The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2021
|
The Efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action: Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2021
|
How well do structural demand models work? Counterfactual predictions in school choice
|
Journal of Econometrics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching
|
American Economic Review: Insights
|
A
|
5
|
|
2020
|
Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2020
|
Do Parents Value School Effectiveness?
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
4
|
|
2018
|
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
4
|
|
2018
|
Free to Choose: Can School Choice Reduce Student Achievement?
|
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2017
|
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2017
|
Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
5
|
|
2017
|
Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
4
|
|
2017
|
Erratum to “Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation”
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
4
|
|
2017
|
Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation
|
Econometrica
|
S
|
4
|
|
2017
|
Conflicts of Interest and Steering in Residential Brokerage
|
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2016
|
Interpreting Tests of School VAM Validity
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
4
|
|
2016
|
Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
4
|
|
2016
|
Stand and Deliver: Effects of Boston's Charter High Schools on College Preparation, Entry, and Choice
|
Journal of Labor Economics
|
A
|
5
|
|
2015
|
How individual preferences are aggregated in groups: An experimental study
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2015
|
The costs of free entry: an empirical study of real estate agents in Greater Boston
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2014
|
The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools
|
Econometrica
|
S
|
3
|
|
2014
|
Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
3
|
|
2013
|
Explaining Charter School Effectiveness
|
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2013
|
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2013
|
The market for borrowing corporate bonds
|
Journal of Financial Economics
|
A
|
4
|
|
2013
|
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters And Pilots
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
5
|
|
2011
|
Forced Sales and House Prices
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2011
|
Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Inputs and Impacts in Charter Schools: KIPP Lynn
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
5
|
|
2010
|
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2010
|
The Impact of Commissions on Home Sales in Greater Boston
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2008
|
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2006
|
The Dynamics of Open-Source Contributors
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2005
|
The New York City High School Match
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2005
|
The Boston Public School Match
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
4
|
|
2005
|
Short interest, institutional ownership, and stock returns
|
Journal of Financial Economics
|
A
|
3
|